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Me, My (Moral) Self, and I 
 
Jim A.C. Everett, Joshua August Skorburg, Jordan L. Livingston 
 
In this chapter we critically review interdisciplinary work from philosophy, psychology, and 
neuroscience to shed light on perceptions of personal identity and selfhood. We review 
recent research that has addressed traditional philosophical questions about personal 
identity using empirical methods, focusing on the “moral self effect”: the finding that 
morality, more so than memory, is perceived to be at the core of personal identity. We 
raise and respond to a number of key questions and criticisms about this work. We begin 
by considering the operationalization of identity concepts in the empirical literature, before 
turning to explore the boundary conditions of “moral self effect” and how generalizable it 
is, and then reflecting on how this work might be connected more deeply with other 
neuroscience research shedding light on the self. Throughout, we highlight connections 
between classical themes in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, while also 
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 2 
Me, My (Moral) Self, and I 
 
What makes you the same person you were five years ago? Will you be the same 
person that will exist in five years time? Would you be the same person if, by some 
fantastical freak of nature, you woke up in someone else’s body? These questions have 
fascinated humans for thousands of years, and with the specter of new technological 
advances such as human-machine cyborgs looming, they will continue to do so. They will 
continue to do so because they get at a fundamental human question: what makes you, 
you? 
In this chapter we outline the interdisciplinary contributions that philosophy, 
psychology, and neuroscience have provided in the understanding of the self and identity, 
focusing on one specific line of burgeoning research: the importance of morality to 
perceptions of self and identity.1 Of course, this rather limited focus will exclude much of 
what psychologists and neuroscientists take to be important to the study of self and 
identity (that plethora of self-hyphenated terms seen in psychology and neuroscience: 
self-regulation, self-esteem, self-knowledge, self-concept, self-perception, and more 
(Katzko, 2003; Klein, 2012). We will likewise not engage with many canonical 
philosophical treatments of self and identity. But we will lay out a body of research that 
brings together classic themes in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience to raise 
empirically tractable philosophical questions, and philosophically rigorous empirical 
questions about self and identity.  
More specifically, in Section 1, we will review some recent research which has 
treated traditional philosophical questions about self and identity as empirical questions. 
Within this body of work, we will be primarily concerned with the finding that morality 
(more so than memory) is perceived to be at the core of self and identity. Then, in Section 
2, we raise and respond to a variety of questions and criticisms: first, about the 
operationalization of identity concepts in the empirical literature; second, about the 
generalizability of the “moral self effect”; third about the direction of change; fourth, about 
connections with recent work in neuroscience; fifth, about the target of evaluation. Finally, 
in Section 3, we consider a variety of implications and applications of this work on the 
moral self. Throughout, we aim to highlight connections between classical themes in 
philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, while also suggesting new directions for 
interdisciplinary collaboration. 
 
1 In this chapter, we use “self and identity” as a catch-all for these various approaches. However, when 
quoting other research or engaging with specific criticisms, terms such as “personal identity”, “identity 
persistence”, etc. will inevitably crop up as well. But unless otherwise noted, we take ourselves to be 
primarily engaging with the (relatively narrow) literature, described in more detail below, which examines 
folk judgments of identity change. 
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1  From the Armchair to the Lab 
Given our limited focus, we follow Shoemaker (2019) in dividing contemporary 
philosophical approaches to morality and personal identity into four broad categories: 
Psychological views, biological views, narrative views, and anthropological views. For 
present purposes, much of the research we describe below is situated within the domain 
of psychological views. This family of views about personal identity generally holds that 
person X at Time 1 is the same person as Y at Time 2 if and only if X is in some sense 
psychologically continuous with Y (henceforth, “psychological continuity” views). There is 
much debate, of course, about what such psychological continuity consists of, but 
following Locke (1975), memory is traditionally thought to be central in this regard. So, X 
at Time 1 is the same person as Y at Time 2 if X can, at one time, remember an 
experience Y had at another time. This vague formulation is subject to a number of 
objections (see Olson 2019 for an overview), but our concern here is not to vindicate or 
impugn any particular version of a psychological theory of personal identity. Instead, we 
want to focus on the ways in which such philosophical theorizing might be informed by 
work in psychology and neuroscience - and also how work in psychology and 
neuroscience can shape philosophical theorizing. 
As Tobia & Shoemaker (forthcoming) point out, if a psychological continuity view 
depends on a certain view of memory or consciousness, then experimental methods 
might eventually be able to clarify the precise mechanisms which support the relevant 
kinds of memory or consciousness. But by and large, this is not the preferred strategy in 
the literature. Instead, much of the relevant interdisciplinary work has focused on 
judgments of identity change and the psychological processes that underlie such 
judgments, and our work is a contribution to this trend. 
In this vein, some of the early work in experimental philosophy took psychological 
continuity views as testable hypotheses. For example, Blok, Newman, & Rips (2005) 
asked participants to imagine that a team of doctors removed a patient’s brain (call him 
“Jim”) and destroyed his body. Then, in one version of the vignette, participants were told 
that the doctors successfully transplanted Jim’s brain into a new body, such that the 
memories in Jim’s brain are preserved in the new body. In another version of the vignette, 
participants were told that the memories were not preserved during the transplant.  
In these kinds of scenarios, psychological continuity theories predict that in cases 
where memories were preserved, participants should judge that the brain recipient is “still 
Jim,” where in cases where the memories are not preserved, participants should disagree 
that the brain recipient is “still Jim.” And indeed, this is precisely what Blok, Newman, & 
Rips (2005) found, and it was also replicated by Nichols & Bruno (2010). There are, as 
we will see below, concerns about the adequacy of this methodology. Still, these studies 
helped to spark a line of research in which armchair philosophical speculation about self 
and identity formed the basis of empirical inquiry. In turn, this methodology opened a 
range of new questions about specific components of psychological continuity views. Is 
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there something special or unique about memory? Or might other psychological features 
be important for understanding judgments about self and identity? 
1.1 The unbearably moral nature of the self  
Even in the earliest accounts of psychological continuity, morality has played an 
important role. After all, for Locke, personal identity could also be understood as “forensic” 
concept: it is tied to memories, but it is also crucial for moral concepts such as 
responsibility, praise and blame.  
In recent years an influential line of work has suggested that morals, more so than 
memories, are actually perceived to be at the heart of self and identity. Sparking this line 
of research, Prinz and Nichols (2017), Strohminger and Nichols (2014) and others, 
presented participants with a wide variety of traits and asked them to imagine how much 
a change to a specific trait would influence whether someone is perceived to be the same 
person (e.g. “Jim can no longer remember anything that happened before the accident. 
Aside from this, he thinks and acts the same way as before the accident. Is Jim still the 
same person as before the accident?”).   
To test the importance of different kinds of psychological traits, Strohminger and 
Nichols (2014) used a variety of items that detailed different changes that a person could 
go through. Some were moral changes (e.g. now Jim is a psychopath or pedophile); 
others were personality changes (e.g. now Jim is shy, or absentminded); others were a 
loss of memories (e.g. now Jim cannot remember time spent with parents, or cannot 
remember how to ride a bike); others were changes to desires and preferences (e.g. now 
Jim desires to eat healthily, or wants to quit smoking); and yet others were perceptual 
(e.g. now Jim has lost his ability to feel pain or see color).  
According to classic psychological continuity views that prioritize memories, one 
should expect changes to memories to be more impactful on perceived identity 
persistence than other kinds of changes. Instead, across the various studies and specific 
items, results have consistently supported a “moral self effect”: when someone changes 
in terms of moral traits like honesty, empathy, or virtuousness, they are rated as more of 
a different person than when they change in terms of memories, preferences, or desires. 
Thus, “moral traits are considered more important to personal identity than any other part 
of the mind” (Strohminger & Nichols 2014, p. 168).  
This finding is not a one-off: The moral self effect holds across a wide variety of 
scenarios (Strohminger, Knobe & Newman, 2016; Prinz & Nichols, 2017) and has been 
replicated across contexts. For example, the effect has been replicated across age 
groups, such that 8 to 10- year-olds rate moral changes as most core to identity (Heiphetz, 
Strohminger, Gelman, & Young, 2018), as well as across cultures, such that Buddhist 
monks in India also rate moral changes as most core to identity (Garfield, Nichols, Ray, 
& Strohminger, 2015). The moral self effect has even been replicated in real-world 
contexts such that family members of patients with neurodegenerative diseases tend to 
rate changes to moral faculties as more disruptive to identity than changes to memories 
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(as in Alzheimer’s disease) or changes to physical motor functions (as in amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis) (Strohminger & Nichols, 2015). In fact, we know of only one group of 
individuals in which the moral self effect does not appear to replicate — in psychopaths 
(Strohminger, 2018).  
 
2 Some Questions and Criticisms from Philosophy, Psychology, and 
Neuroscience  
Having reviewed some of the relevant work on the moral self effect, we now turn to in-
depth considerations of some questions and criticisms of this research program.  First, 
we will consider prominent criticisms about the operationalization of identity concepts in 
the moral self literature and we will detail some responses based on our recent work. 
Next, we raise questions about the applicability and generalizability of the moral self 
effect. Then, we will consider questions about the direction of change and connections 
with related research on the “true self”. Finally, we draw novel connections with recent 
work in neuroscience. Throughout, given the interdisciplinary nature of the topic, we argue 
that philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience can each contribute to addressing these 
questions, albeit to varying degrees. In the section that follows, we review the ways in 
which each discipline has contributed to addressing these questions, noting the strength 
and weaknesses of each approach, and incorporating a review of our own 
interdisciplinary work along the way. 
2.1  Is Identity Quantitative, Qualitative, or Both? 
A prominent question that has been raised in response to the findings canvassed 
above is whether, when faced with these thought experiments, participants are really 
reporting that someone has become a different person, or if instead, they are just 
reporting dissimilarity. (Berniunas & Dranseika, 2016; Dranseika, 2017;  Starmans & 
Bloom, 2018). In the philosophical literature (something like) this idea has been variously 
conceptualized as the difference between quantitative identity on the one hand, and 
qualitative identity, on the other (Parfit, 1984; Schechtman, 1996).  
When faced with a question like “Is X the same as before?”, Schechteman (1996) 
notes that there are two different approaches. The first concerns re-identification: What 
are the necessary and sufficient conditions under which X at Time 1 is identical to Y at 
Time 2? These kinds of questions are about the logical relation of identity, and are often 
discussed in terms of quantitative or numerical identity. The second concerns 
characterization: What makes X the person that they are? These questions are about 
which actions, beliefs, values, desires, and traits are properly attributable to a person, 
and are often discussed under the heading of qualitative identity. Similarly, Parfit (1984) 
highlights the importance of distinguishing qualitative vs. numerical identity:  
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There are two kinds of sameness, or identity. I and my Replica are qualitatively 
identical, or exactly alike. But we may not be numerically identical, or one and the 
same person. Similarly, two white billiard balls are not numerically but may be 
qualitatively identical. If I paint one of these balls red, it will cease to be qualitatively 
identical with itself as it was. But the red ball that I later see and the white ball that 
I painted red are [numerically] identical. They are one and the same ball. (p 201) 
 
When it comes to persons, twins, for example, can be qualitatively identical, but 
still numerically distinct people: you might not be able to tell them apart, but they still need 
two passports to travel abroad. Variants of this distinction have been used to criticize the 
early studies on the importance of memories to identity persistence (e.g. Blok, Newman, 
& Rips, 2005, 2007; Nichols and Bruno, 2010).  
As Berniunas and Dranseika (2016) argue, these experimental designs potentially 
conflate qualitative and numerical concepts of identity. When Nichols and Bruno (2010) 
ask participants “What is required for some person in the future to be the same person as 
you?”, it is possible that participants are interpreting this question in a qualitative, not 
numerical sense. To illustrate this, Berniunas & Dranseika draw on a convenient pair of 
Lithuanian phrases that disambiguate the two: tas pats and toks pats 2. When explicitly 
disambiguating these two senses to their Lithuanian participants, they found that 
participants were significantly more likely to agree that someone was the “same person” 
after losing their memories, suggesting that “retention of memory may not be so critical 
to the preservation of individual numerical identity” (Berniunas & Dranseika, 2016, p.115). 
In the context of work on the moral self effect, Starmans and Bloom (2018) similarly 
leverage this distinction between quantitative and qualitative identity. They claim that 
while Strohminger and colleagues have sought to make claims about quantitative identity 
(“After changing morally, can I identify X as the same person?”), they are actually 
obtaining participants’ intuitions about qualitative identity (“After changing morally, is X 
dissimilar to how they were before?”). While it makes sense, they argue, that if Jim lost 
his moral conscience after an accident he would seem like a qualitatively different person, 
it wouldn’t make sense to suggest that post-accident-Jim is numerically distinct from pre-
accident-Jim, such that pre-accident-Jim’s debts are now forgiven, or that post-accident-
Jim must now get a new passport. Jim is still the same person, he’s just dissimilar from 
before. The worry is that the measures typically used in the moral self effect studies 
cannot clearly differentiate between these different senses of identity. Starmans and 
 
2 When contrasted with toks pats, tas pats means “the same” in the sense of numerical identity while toks 
pats means “the same” in the sense of qualitative identity. As they reminded their participants in the studies, 
“If we have two white billiard balls, we can say that they are toks pats, but they are not tas pats billiard ball. 
If we paint one of the balls red, it is not toks pats billiard ball as before, but it is still tas pats, only painted” 




Bloom (2018) thus suggest that “we cannot tell whether these data reflect people’s 
intuitions about similarity or about numerical identity....but we think that the most natural 
reading of these questions leads participants to answer in terms of similarity, not personal 
identity. In the real world, nobody sees moral changes as influencing identity.” (p.567) 
Here, we want to consider a few potential responses to these criticisms.3 First, we 
are not sure that it is entirely possible to separate qualitative from quantitative identity in 
the way Starmans and Bloom’s criticism seems to require. Second, we are not convinced 
that either in folk psychology or philosophy, morality is unimportant to identity.  
More recent psychological continuity accounts have tended to focus on the degree 
of psychological connectedness. According to Parfit (1984), such psychological 
connectedness does include memories, but also psychological dispositions, attitudes, 
personality, preferences, and so on. This has elements of qualitative identity (a greater 
degree of psychological connectedness means that someone is more similar), but also 
numerical identity, because it is the degree of psychological connectedness that allows 
us to identify a person at different times as the same. Both of these points suggest that a 
strict division between qualitative and quantitative identity may be untenable.  
There is also an empirical response to the criticisms raised above. One might think 
that judgements of identity change should have concomitant practical consequences. 
Presumably, if you judge someone to be a different person now than they were before, 
you would also judge that they are likely to behave differently than before. In the context 
of the moral self effect, a person’s loss of morals should then lead participants to expect 
more, or worse, practical consequences for that person than with equivalent losses of 
memories, preferences, desires, etc. And indeed, in some of our work we have shown 
that compared to memories, moral changes not only affected perceptions of identity 
persistence (as in previous studies), but, crucially, such changes also led participants to 
subsequently infer a range of practical consequences, including changes in behavior, 
evaluations by third parties, and reductions in relationship quality (Everett, Skorburg et 
al., Unpublished Manuscript).  
To address this question of whether moral changes are affecting judgments of (in 
Starmans and Bloom’s terms) quantitative identity or mere similarity, we drew on the idea 
of special obligations: the duties we have to someone simply because of who they are. 
One might think, for example, that someone has obligations to their mother that they don’t 
have to a stranger, and these special obligations towards their mother do not change 
even if she were to suffer a severe, debilitating illness that changed her personality. 
Someone’s obligations and duties to her are the same because she herself is the same 
person, however dissimilar she is now to how she was in her prime. If participants judge 
that their own special moral obligations towards a loved one are more affected when their 
loved one loses their morality (compared to losing their memories), this might suggest 
 
3 This sections draws from and expands upon Everett, Skorburg, & Savulescu (2020). 
 8 
that participants are not thinking solely in terms of similarity. And in fact, our results do 
suggest that something like this is the case (Everett, Skorburg, & Savulescu, 2020).  
 
In our studies, we presented participants with a classic ‘body switch’ thought 
experiment in which a loved one undergoes a brain transplant with a stranger, and as a 
consequence either experiences no psychological change (the control condition), loses 
all their memories, or completely loses their moral conscience. After assessing 
perceptions of identity persistence, we presented a moral dilemma, asking participants to 
imagine that one of the patients must die (Study 1) or be left alone in a care home for the 
rest of their life (Study 2). In our studies, participants were made to decide who they would 
save or care for: the patient with their partner’s brain and the stranger’s body, or the 
patient with the stranger’s brain and the patient’s body.   
This enabled us to test two things. First, it enabled us to replicate and extend 
previous empirical studies looking at whether people see psychological continuity as more 
important than physical continuity. And indeed, in line with previous work, in our control 
condition we found that participants were much more likely both to judge that the person 
with their partner’s brain and the stranger’s body was the ‘real’ partner, and to think that 
their moral duties towards this person were stronger than to the person with the stranger’s 
brain and their partner’s body. More importantly, though, by also including two conditions 
where, after the patient either lost all their memories or completely lost their moral 
conscience, we could also see whether changes to morals would be more disruptive than 
changes to memories for participants’ perceived moral duties towards the patient.  
If Starmans and Bloom’s criticism (i.e. that previous studies on the moral self effect 
are only about similarity, not identity) is on the right track, then we should see no change 
to perceptions of moral duties depending on whether someone lost their memories or 
morals. The partners described in the vignettes might be perceived as more dissimilar if 
they have lost their morals (i.e. qualitatively different) but they would still be judged as the 
same person (i.e. numerically identifiable as the same person), and so presumably the 
special obligations would remain intact.  
Indeed, we found some evidence that participants thought their moral duties 
towards the partner were, in fact, decreased when their partner experienced changes to 
their morality compared to when they experienced changes to memories, or experienced 
no psychological (but only physical) change. These results suggest that participants, to 
some extent, do perceive a person’s identity to be disrupted by their loss of memories or 
morality, and that previous results are not only about perceived similarity (Everett, 
Skorburg, & Savulescu, 2020).  
Taken together, the conceptual and empirical responses to challenges about the 
operationalization of identity concepts in the moral self literature suggests that folk 
intuitions about self and identity likely involve (again, using Starmans and Bloom’s terms) 
both identity and similarity, and these are likely flexibly activated and focused on both 
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qualitative and quantitative identity in different contexts depending on the task at hand. 
We address the philosophical implications of this suggestion in Section 3 below. 
2.2  Is the moral self effect generalizable? 
2.2.1 Is the moral self effect only applicable to fantastical thought 
experiments? 
For all the work that philosophers and psychologists have done on the experimental 
philosophy of self and identity, one might still wonder whether this is meaningful. Much of 
the literature (our contributions included) tends to use vignette-based studies employing 
far-fetched, science-fiction-like examples involving e.g., brain transplants, body-switches, 
magic pills, time machines, and reincarnation. While these scenarios might be helpful to 
clarify intuitions about philosophical thought experiments, it is also important to explore 
whether and to what extent the moral self effect holds in more common, everyday cases. 
Here again, our work has focused on the practical consequences of judgements about 
self and identity. 
One way of testing the generalizability of the moral self effect outside the realm of 
thought experiments is to look at real-life cases characterized by changes to morals and 
memories. In this vein, Strohminger & Nichols (2015) looked at ratings of identity 
persistence by family members of patients with different neurodegenerative diseases. By 
including patients with different kinds of diseases and different symptoms, they could look 
at how family members judged that someone was the same person after they experienced 
changes to moral faculties (as in some cases of frontotemporal dementia) compared 
changes to memories (as in Alzheimer’s disease) or changes to physical motor functions 
(as in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis). Mirroring the findings from thought experiments, their 
results show that family members of patients with frontotemporal dementia, which was 
associated with moral changes, rated the patient as more of a different person than did 
family members of patients with other kinds of diseases. Of course, while such studies 
provide evidence of how the moral self effect emerges in real-world contexts, their high 
ecological validity does come with less control: these patients will all have different 
presentations of symptoms, will differ in severity, and so on. 
In a recent paper, we extended this line of work by taking a mixed approach using 
an experimental philosophy method with tightly controlled vignettes, but focusing on real-
life cases of addiction (Earp, Skorburg, Everett, & Savulescu, 2019). Why addiction? A 
common refrain from family members and friends of addicts is that the person they knew 
before is not the same as the addict now. As one mother put it, “Six years have passed 
since I discovered that my son was using drugs. I [was] devastated, not to mention how 
worried I was about his well-being. My son was not the same person anymore” (Urzia 
2014, emphasis added).  
As Tobia (2017) notes, such stories are all too common: “Many have witnessed 
someone they loved change so profoundly that the person remaining seems an entirely 
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different one.” Moreover, addiction is highly moralized in a way that say, dementia, is not. 
As a result, we hypothesized that the processes at play in the moral self effect might also 
arise in the context of addiction. That is, if an agent’s becoming addicted to drugs leads 
to the perception that they are a “different person”, this may be due to a presumed 
diminishment in moral character that such addiction stereotypically brings about. Across 
six studies, we found that participants judged an agent who became addicted to drugs as 
being closer to “a completely different person” than “completely the same person” and 
that these judgments of identity change are indeed driven by perceived negative changes 
in the moral character of drug users (Earp, Skorburg, Everett, & Savulescu, 2019). 
We take these results (along with others discussed below) as evidence that the 
moral self effect does indeed generalize to various contexts beyond the tightly controlled, 
and sometimes far-fetched realm of philosophical thought experiments. We discuss some 
implications and potential applications in Section 3. 
2.2.2 Does the direction of moral change matter? 
An important question has been looming in the background so far. The moral self 
effect assumes that morality is at the heart of self and identity, such that changes to 
morals are more disruptive than other kinds of changes. This conclusion has almost 
exclusively been drawn from studies focusing on perceived identity persistence following 
either a loss a morals or a loss of memories. But what if certain features are gained 
instead?  
Work on the “true self” suggests that the direction of moral change could matter. A 
number of studies have suggested that people typically regard others’ true selves as 
being fundamentally good (Newman, Bloom, and Knobe 2014; De Freitas et al. 2018; 
Newman, De Freitas, and Knobe 2015; Bench et al. 2015). As people become more moral 
they are perceived to get closer to their true self or their ‘essence’, whereas when they 
become less moral, they are perceived to move further away from their true self (Bench 
et al. 2015; Tobia 2017).   
Tobia (2015) draws on the well-worn (if potentially apocryphal) case study of 
Phineas Gage: a railroad worker who experienced brain damage in a horrific accident, 
after which he was reported to have become cruel and impulsive - so much so that “he 
was no longer Gage”. In his work, Tobia gave participants one of two versions of this 
story. In one condition, participants saw the “standard” case of Phineas Gage, where he 
was kind before the accident, but cruel afterwards. That is, where Gage morally 
deteriorated. In another condition, holding the magnitude of the change constant, 
participants saw a vignette where Gage was described as cruel before the accident, but 
kind afterward. That is, where Gage morally improved. In both conditions, Tobia asked 
participants to judge whether Phineas Gage was the same person as before the accident. 
He found that Gage was less likely to be judged as identical to his pre-accident self when 
the change was in a “bad” direction (deteriorating from kind to cruel) than when the 
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change was in a “good” direction (improving from cruel to kind) even when the magnitude 
of the change was held constant.  
These findings were further substantiated by a study demonstrating that moral 
enhancement is less disruptive to perceptions of identity than moral degradation and that 
moral degradation is especially disruptive to perceptions of identity when people expect 
moral enhancement (Molouki & Bartels, 2017). That said, Prinz and Nichols (2017) also 
report findings suggesting that whether moral changes were in a positive or negative 
direction did not matter: that “moral changes are regarded as threats to identity, 
regardless of whether those changes are good or bad” (p.454). While somewhat mixed, 
these findings at least raise the interesting suggestion that judgments of identity change 
are not solely a function of the magnitude of the change, but could be importantly related 
to the direction of the change. When people are perceived as deteriorating (and especially 
when they are perceived to deteriorate morally), they might be judged to be more of a 
different person than when they improve or change in a positive direction. 
While this work suggests that the direction of moral change could play an important 
role in the moral self effect (in line with what would be predicted based on the true self 
literature), more work is necessary on how direction and the type of change interact - and 
how both of these interact depending on the target of the judgment. Perhaps, for example, 
gaining new memories is more disruptive than both losing memories and losing morals. 
Or perhaps all of this depends on whether participants are thinking about themselves, a 
friend, a stranger, or an enemy. In the same study mentioned above, Prinz and Nichols 
(2017) focus on judgments of the self and other, and found that the pattern for others 
replicated when thinking of the self: that it mattered more when the changes were moral, 
but it didn’t matter which direction the change were in. This, of course, goes against the 
suggestion in other work (e.g. Tobia, 2015, Molouki & Bartels, 2017) – perhaps different 
results would be obtained with a within-subjects “one change” paradigm used by 
Strohminger and Nichols (2016), and perhaps it matters who specifically the target is (see 
next section).  
In recent work, we sought to shed more light on how the direction of change and 
target might interact. We asked participants to imagine someone changing in a variety of 
ways (morality, memories, warmth, and competence), where some participants read that 
someone increased the trait (i.e. became more moral, or gained new memories), while 
others, as in other studies, read that someone deteriorated (i.e. becomes less moral, or 
lost memories). Our results showed that changes to morality were most disruptive to 
perceived identity, but that the direction of change mattered too: a friend became more of 
a different person when they became less moral, but a foe became more of a different 
person when they became more moral.  
Together, all these results suggest that the direction of change does matter – that 
even if morals tend to be more disruptive for identity than memories, losing morals can 
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be more impactful than gaining morals. Intriguingly, though, this also seems sensitive to 
the target of the thought experiment: who are we thinking of? 
2.2.3 Does the target matter? 
From a philosophical perspective, one might think that the primacy of morality or 
memories (or whatever else) for identity should be insensitive to who we’re thinking about. 
If memories are at the core of psychological continuity, then this finding should hold for 
judgments about the self, but also for strangers, friends, or even enemies. And indeed, 
much of the work we discussed in the previous sections has found that the moral self 
effect does not tend to depend on the target of evaluation (e.g. first vs third person 
judgments). Yet these findings are somewhat surprising in light of traditional findings in 
social psychology that show pervasive effects of target, such that perceptions of self are 
often biased in certain ways in comparison to perceptions of another (and vice versa). 
For example, people typically think of themselves differently from others with a strong 
actor-observer bias (e.g. Ross, 1977) and think of those close to them differently from 
others (e.g. Alves, Koch, & Unkelbach, 2016; Simon, 1992), and tend to rate morality as 
being more important for the self and people close to them than for strangers or people 
they dislike (e.g. Brown, 1986; Epley & Dunning, 2000; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). 
Given that these first and third-person asymmetries are so pervasive in the field of 
psychology, similar findings would be expected within the sub-field of empirical 
approaches to self and identity4. However, to date, first and third-person asymmetries 
have not been observed for studies investigating identity change. One of the first studies 
to consider the role of target showed that a body-switching paradigm yielded similar 
results regardless of target (Nichols & Bruno, 2010), and some of the earliest work on the 
moral-self effect demonstrated that moral change was more important than memories 
whether it was presented in a first or third-person perspective (Prinz & Nichols, 2017). 
More recently, no difference was observed in a series of studies directly comparing the 
moral self effect for self and a hypothetical other (“Chris”), albeit showing stronger effects 
of changes in certain moral traits on other compared to self (Heiphetz, Strohminger, & 
Young, 2017). Moreover, our work examining the effect of target across many different 
categories showed that the moral self effect holds across self, known friend, and unknown 
stranger, but not for a known foe (although the self and friend condition were not 
compared directly), again showing a small to negligible effect of target for self and (most) 
others (Everett, et al., Unpublished Manuscript).  
It is possible that the lack of asymmetry between self and other reflects the implicit 
positive nature of the moral self across most targets (Strohminger, Newman, & Knobe, 
2016). Indeed, the “true self” literature has demonstrated that although our own true 
selves are deemed to be inherently good, so are the true selves of others (Bench et al., 
 
4 This section (2.2.3), and the section on neural mechanisms of target (2.3.1), are drawn from and expand 
upon Jordan Livingston's doctoral dissertation. 
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2015). This lack of the actor-observer bias for moral traits may be one reason that the 
effect is not observed in the studies reviewed above. However, there are other plausible 
avenues of explanation. Although there are well-known asymmetries for perceiving self 
and other, there are also asymmetries and biases for perceiving the self in the past, 
present, and the future (Ersner-Hershfield, Wimmer, & Knutson, 2008; Quoidbach, 
Gilbert, & Wilson, 2013; Bartels & Urminsky, 2011), such that thinking about the self in a 
hypothetical thought experiment may not be the same as thinking about the self in the 
here and now. Moreover, many of the moral self studies to date have not used specified 
targets, and using a more concrete, known target might influence the results (see Everett 
et al. Under Review, and Everett et al. In Prep, for exceptions). Regardless of whether 
the judgments change in different circumstances, the mechanisms driving the effects, or 
lack thereof, remain to be explored in the future. 
 
2.3 What are the mechanisms underlying the moral self effect? 
2.3.1 Neural mechanisms of target  
Neuroimaging can potentially help to clarify some of the questions posed above. For 
example, neuroimaging studies investigating self-referential processing (in the traditional 
psychological sense) have found that when individuals are asked to indicate whether a 
series of trait words describe themselves or another individual, this processing tends to 
recruit the cortical midline structures of the brain (precuneus and medial prefrontal 
cortex), with self-referential activity recruiting activity in more ventral regions of the medial 
prefrontal cortex and other-referential processing recruiting activity in more dorsal regions 
of the medial prefrontal cortex (Denney et al., 2012; Wagner et al., 2012). 
It is not entirely clear why this pattern of activity exists, and it is unlikely that the 
differential activity is entirely a result of the target of investigation (self or other). For 
example, information about the self tends to be inherently more positive than information 
about other individuals, and this difference is also reflected at the neural level, with self-
referential neural activity sharing highly overlapping patterns with both positively-
valenced information (Chavez, Heatherton, & Wagner, 2016) and value-based 
processing (Berkman, Livingston, & Kahn, 2017; Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, 
& Wager, 2011). Information about the self, by its very nature, is also more familiar than 
information about other individuals, and brain regions tracking self-relevant information 
may be tied not only to value but also to familiarity (Lin, Horner, & Burgess, 2016). 
Regardless of what is being tracked in these regions, the constellation of activity can 
be informative, particularly along the ventral to dorsal gradient. Indeed, studies have 
shown that the closeness of a target to the self can be tracked such that targets closer to 
the self activate more ventral regions of the medial prefrontal cortex whereas targets less 
close to the self activate more dorsal regions of the medial prefrontal cortex (Mitchell, 
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Banaji, & Macrae, 2006), with very close targets demonstrating overlapping activity (Zhu 
et al., 2007).  
Moreover, the activity within these regions varies, to some extent, with elements of 
hypothetical thought. Counterfactual thinking for self and for other has demonstrated a 
similar ventral to dorsal gradient in the brain (De Brigard, Spreng, Mitchell, and Schacter, 
2015). Thinking about the self in the future, too, tends to recruit regions of the cortical 
midline structures, as part of the default mode network (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Buckner, 
Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008). Whereas some studies have found that thinking 
about the self in the future activates more dorsal (as compared to ventral) regions of the 
medial prefrontal cortex (Packer & Cunningham, 2009), others have found that thinking 
about the self in the future compared to the present simply recruits the ventral medial 
prefrontal cortex to a lesser degree (Ersner-Hershfield, Wimmer, & Knutson, 2008, Tamir 
& Mitchell, 2011; D'Argembeau et al., 2010).  
This body of research offers a number of potential resources for generating 
hypotheses about the neural mechanisms underlying the moral self effect. At a general 
level, given that thinking about identity is very person-centered, activation in cortical 
midline structures of the brain is likely still expected. More specifically, if self-other 
asymmetries are absent from the moral self literature because thinking about a 
hypothetical self is akin to thinking about another person, overlapping activity in dorsal 
regions of the medial prefrontal cortex might be expected.  
Alternatively, if self-other asymmetries are absent from the empirical literature on 
self and identity because thinking about another individual changing on a moral dimension 
is valuable to the self, overlapping activity in ventral regions of the medial prefrontal cortex 
might be expected. In any case, identifying the neural processes underlying the moral self 
effect could help to clarify why the primacy of morality in identity does not seem to depend 
on the target.  
2.3.2 Neural mechanisms of values and traits 
 
Identifying the neural mechanisms underlying the moral self effect could also help 
to clarify questions concerning why morality, above and beyond other personality traits, 
appears to be so essential to identity. 
Among other things, morality can be understood as sets of norms within a society 
that are distinguished because they are somehow more important or more valued (see 
e.g., Copp, 2001), and the social nature of morality helps to highlight its value. For 
example, a person is likely to care about a change to her friend because she may no 
longer receive the benefits of being socially tied to her friend. However, the same person 
is also likely to care about her own morality given that it impacts her own social reputation. 
In both scenarios, the social features of morality ensure that changes to friends or 
changes to self are quite important, or valuable, to the self, and recent work supports the 
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idea that perceived importance to self mediates judgments of identity change (Heiphetz, 
Strohminger, & Young, 2017).   
Incorporating evidence from neuroscience can help to assess whether the moral 
self effect is indeed driven by value-based processing (see May et al., this volume, for an 
overview of the value-based mechanisms posited by much recent work in the moral 
judgment and moral learning literature). Broadly, evidence increasingly suggests that 
moral cognition is best understood not as a unique and modular set of capacities, but 
rather, in terms of more domain-general processes of reasoning, value-integration, 
reward processing, and decision-making.  
For example, Shenhav & Greene (2010, 2014) have argued that value-based 
processing is crucial for understanding moral judgment such that when participants are 
asked to imagine classic sacrificial dilemmas in which they can either do nothing and risk 
the death of a large group of people or do something at the expense of a single individual, 
value-based sub-regions of the brain are largely involved in making these types of 
calculations. A related set of studies have implicated value-based computation in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex during charitable giving (Hare, Camerer, Knoepfle, & 
Rangel, 2010; Hutcherson, Bushong, & Rangel, 2015), and yet another found that moral 
transgressions disrupt neural representations of value in this same region (Crockett et al., 
2017). Based on this body of evidence, it seems likely that some sort of value-based 
processing also underpins the moral self effect such that moral traits might elicit activity 
in value-based regions of the brain, either selectively or more strongly than other non-
moral (e.g., personality traits).  
Although a value-based mechanism for the moral self effect would not be entirely 
surprising, it could help to push forward the field in two important ways. First, a 
mechanistic understanding of the moral self effect could help to elucidate the broader 
relationship between morality and identity. One recent commentary called into question 
whether morality is as important to identity, as identity is important to morality 
(Strohminger, 2018). We propose that the relationship between the two may be best 
clarified by assessing their common mechanisms. 
Identity, like morality, relies on value-based processing: recent studies note strong 
overlap between neural activity associated with thinking about identity and value (Kim & 
Johnson, 2015, Northoff & Hayes, 2011), and a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies 
on self and value reveals a large cluster of overlapping activation in the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) (Berkman, Livingston, & Kahn, 2017). Morality and identity, 
then, are likely intimately related via their value-based processing, and evaluating morality 
and identity in terms of their value-based processing may provide another currency with 
which to assess the nature of their relationship. 
In addition to clarifying the nature of the relationship between morality and identity, 
a value-based approach to understanding the moral self effect could help to push forward 
the field of neuroscience, itself. Within the vast set of neuroscience studies that have 
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taken up issues of self and identity, most have utilized a task that prompts participants to 
rate the extent to which different personality trait words describe themselves (Denny, 
Kober, Wagner, & Ochsner, 2012; Wagner, Haxby, & Heatherton, 2012), an approach 
which remains the gold standard. 
However, despite the task’s popularity, very few studies have reported any neural 
differences in assessing the effect of trait type (Pfeifer et al., 2013; Pfeifer et al., 2009). 
One of the reasons why differences across traits are not reported is because most effects 
of traits may not become evident when using traditional univariate analysis. In contrast, 
more nuanced multivariate techniques are revealing neural differences in, for example, 
the types of information we use to organize our representations of other people (Tamir, 
Thornton, Contreras, Mitchell, 2016). Insights from the moral self effect highlighting the 
privileged status of moral (vs. non-moral) trait words and their distinct neural mechanisms 
(e.g., value-based processing) could motivate future neuroscience studies to continue in 
this tradition — using more advanced techniques to pay attention to differences between 
trait words.  
In this sense, not only can neuroscience help to clarify mechanisms underlying the 
moral self effect, but insights from the moral self literature that stem from philosophy and 
psychology can make important contributions to the ongoing work on the neuroscience 
of self and identity.  
3 Implications  
In this final section, we will consider a few implications and applications for the moral self 
research program. In particular, we attempt to contextualize how the nuanced questions 
and concerns outlined in the previous section might have bearing on a broader range of 
practical issues. 
3.1 Practical Implications  
3.1.1 Behavior Change and Self-Regulation 
One way that clarifying the psychological and neural processes involved in 
judgments about self and identity is important is that this research might have the potential 
to provide insights into translational work in domains such as self-regulation.  
One example comes from the intriguing possibility that identity judgments could be 
leveraged as a tool for behavior change. For instance, the identity-value model of self-
regulation holds that identity serves as a salient value-input for facilitating successful self-
regulation and that stable, value-laden sources of identity are strongest (Berkman, 
Livingston, & Kahn, 2017). If morality is, as the foregoing results suggest, core to identity 
and is driven by value-based processing, it may be a candidate target for interventions 
seeking to promote behavior change. Of course, given that morality is so essential to 
identity, it may also be tougher to manipulate than other aspects of identity; to this effect, 
one recent paper found that people do not desire to be more moral, in part because they 
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already perceive themselves to be quite moral (Sun & Goodwin, 2019). However, just 
because people do not desire to be more moral does not mean that moral identity cannot 
be used as an effective motivator. 
 
Indeed, identity has often been used as a source of moral motivation (e.g., Hardy & 
Carlo, 2005, 2011), and appealing to moral reasoning has been shown to motivate 
compliance on certain behaviors such as paying taxes (e.g., Blumenthal, Christian, 
Slemrod, & Smith, 2001; Ariel, 2012) and environmental conservation (Bolderdijk, Steg, 
Geller, Lehman, Postume, 2012; Hopper & Nielson, 1991). Given that many self-
regulatory failures are often moralized (Rozin & Singh, 1999; Frank & Nagel, 2017), 
appealing to moral identities and values may be an effective strategy for motivating 
successful self-regulation, as well. 
Moreover, counterfactual thought experiments, such as those traditionally used by 
philosophers, might also play a key role in motivating self-regulation. Many effective self-
regulation techniques already draw upon hypothetical and imaginative cognitive 
techniques encouraging individuals to think about themselves in new and alternative ways 
(Kross et al., 2014; White et al., 2016). Encouraging participants to imagine the degree 
to which they would become a new person if they were to achieve a goal (e.g., “become 
a whole new you!”) could provide an avenue for examining ways in which identity and 
value facilitate self-regulation. Exploring the mechanisms underlying the traditional moral 
self effect, although not directly related to translational applications, may be able to help 
motivate work in this direction.  
3.1.2 Punishment and Responsibility 
It is evident that, philosophically, identity has long been thought to be connected to 
moral concepts of blame, punishment, and responsibility. Practically, the research 
discussed in this chapter highlights how judgments about blame and responsibility are 
affected by perceptions of identity continuity—or disruption. We have already discussed 
work showing how someone’s becoming addicted to drugs leads to the perception that 
they are a “different person”, seemingly caused by perceived negative changes in the 
moral character of drug users (Earp et al. 2019). As another example, Gomez-Lavin & 
Prinz (2019) have examined the moral self effect in the context of parole decisions, finding 
that participants were significantly more likely to grant parole to offenders who underwent 
changes in their moral values, compared to mere behavioral changes. It will be interesting 
for future work to consider in more depth the way that appeals to identity are used in both 
legal and forensic settings to justify responsibility and punishment. 
3.1.1 Bioethics and New Technologies 
Another example which has garnered much attention as of late involves patients 
undergoing neurostimulation, such as Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) treatments for 
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Parkinson’s Disease. In one case report, after 18 months of DBS, a patient’s motor 
symptoms were improved, but it was reported that “she was no longer able to work, had 
a loss of inspiration and a taste for her work and for life in general,” and she said, “Now I 
feel like a machine, I’ve lost my passion. I don’t recognize myself anymore” (Schüpbach 
et al., 2006, p. 1812). In light of this story (and many others like it), Skorburg & Sinnott-
Armstrong (forthcoming) have suggested that because people tend to see moral traits as 
especially identity-conferring, measuring changes to moral functioning pre- and post-DBS 
should be a priority for neuroethicists concerned with identity changes brought about by 
DBS and other forms of neurostimulation.  
 
3.2 Philosophical Implications  
So far, most of our discussion has centered around experimental approaches to 
questions about self and identity. Here, we want to consider the extent to which such 
empirical work has bearing on more traditional philosophical theorizing about personal 
identity. Consider the following argument, adapted from Bernianus & Dranseika (2016) 
and  Nichols & Bruno (2010): 
 
1. If it is appropriate to consider folk intuitions in assessing theories of personal 
identity, then, ceteris paribus, folk intuitions that are more robust ought to be given 
more weight in assessing theories of personal identity. 
2. Folk intuitions favoring psychological continuity accounts of personal identity are 
especially robust. 
3. Therefore, if it is appropriate to rely on folk intuitions in assessing theories of 
personal identity, then, ceteris paribus, folk intuitions favoring psychological 
continuity accounts of personal identity ought to be given special weight in 
assessing theories of personal identity 
 
Of course, one important question here is whether it is indeed appropriate to rely on 
folk intuitions about personal identity. After all, one might reasonably hold that what lay-
people think is irrelevant to the fundamental metaphysical questions about personal 
identity. Perhaps the fact that ordinary people perceive morality as important to personal 
identity simply misses the point. What really matters is some metaphysical account of 
continuity. But this can only hold if we assume a “deep” metaphysical notion of identity, 
which need not be the only game in town (Prinz & Nichols, 2017). There is surely a sense 
in which some philosophical problems of identity are deeply metaphysical in this way. But 
as Prinz & Nichols (2017) point out, other questions about personal identity are not deep 
in the sense that they don’t “depend on some hidden fact about the structure of reality”. 




If we are right that questions of personal identity are settled by how we do, in fact, 
classify, then this is a case where experimental philosophy can actually contribute 
to metaphysical debates. Surveys, in this case, do not just tell us what ordinary 
people think; they reveal the actual correlates of identity, because ordinary 
practices of classification determine conditions of identity.” (Prinz & Nichols, 2017, 
p.450) 
 
If all of this is on the right track and it is indeed appropriate to rely on the robust folk 
intuitions for philosophical debates, then we need to be clear on which folk intuitions are 
robust. In this chapter, we have considered numerous challenges and criticisms of the 
moral self effect, along with a wide range of replications and extensions. We think there 
is ample evidence to support the claim that the moral self effect is robust. As a result, we 
contend that, within psychological continuity views of personal identity, theories which 
emphasize the importance of morality ought to be given pride of place. Similarly, insofar 
as the results we have described are robust, then this could also entail that the prominent 
position afforded to memories within psychological continuity views may need to be 
revised and reconsidered. In any case, by drawing on the philosophical, psychological, 
and neuroscientific work on the moral self, we hope to have shown that a topic as complex 
and important as the moral self will surely require collaborations among philosophers, 
psychologists, and neuroscientists, among others. 
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